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Kellog v. Howes, 8i Cal., 17o. But
under the statute as it reads, there
is no possible way for the owner to
prevent liens attaching, except by
obtaining the written consent of
persons who may be absolutely unknown to him until after the mischief has been done.
Whether or not such an Act will
be held constitutional, it seems
to the writer, must depend very
much upon what the Court before
whom the Act comes shaill deem to

be good public policy. If the Court
considered that the lien of the mechanic is something to which he
is reasonably entitled, and which
tends to the well-being of the community, the statute will probably
be upheld: Henry & Coatsworth
Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo., 47; Merrigan
v. Efiglish, 5 L. R. A., 37; Colpetzer
v. Trinity Church, 24 Neb., 113;
Albright v. Smith, 51 N. XV., 590.
Contra, Spry Lumber Co. v. Trust
Co., 77 Mich., i99.
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COURT

Nebraska ex rel Thayer,

decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on the
first of last February, and digested in our abstracts of
cases for this number, excited considerable interest on
account of the political importance of the result, since the
decision involved the question of who had the right to the
Governorship of Nebraska. It will probably be remembered, however, not on this account, but because it meets
and decides for the first time an important question relating
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The facts of the
case were briefly these :
The Constitution of the State provided that no one
was eligible to hold office in the SLate who had not been
for two years previous to his election a citizen of the
United States. James A. Boyd received the highest number of votes at the fall election of I89o , but after his
inauguration he was ousted from his office by, the Supreme
Court of the State on the ground that he had not been for
the two years previous to his election a citizen of the
United States. Boyd then appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Chief Justice, Mfr. Justice
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dissenting, delivered the-opinion of the Court, and
upheld the jurisdiction on the ground that a right claimed
FIELD

under a statute of the United States is drawn in question,

and that the decision of the State Court had been adverse
to the claimant. He says: "Each State has the power to
prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in
which they shall be chosen, and the title to offices shall be
tried, whether in the judicial court or otherwise. But
when the trial is in the, courts, it is 'a case,' and if a
defence is interposed under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and is overruled, then, as in any other case
decided by the highest court of the State, this Court has
jurisdiction by writ of error."' The Court here simply
follows the opinion of Mr. Justice BROWN in the case of
Missouri v. Andriano." In that case the question in dispute
was the right to act as Sheriff of a county in Missouri.
Under the law of the State no one but a citizen of the
United States could hold office in the State. The Supreme
Court of the State, reversiig the court below, held that the
respondent, whose citizenship was in question, was a citizen
of the United States, and, therefore, entitled to the office.
The decision being in favor of the right claimed, the
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed the writ of
error, but Mr. Justice BROWN distinctly said that, had the
decision of the Supreme Courts of the State been against
the right claimed, they would, without question, -have had
jurisdiction.
The text of the dissent of Mr. Justice FIELD in the
Nebraska Governorship case has not yet been published,
and we are unable to state the exact grounds on which it
is placed.
The question presented is one of great interest, and we
cannot but regret that the Court did not go more fully into
the grounds of their decision. The argument against the
jurisdiction which will occur to every one is briefly this:
The State alone has the right to prescribe the qualifications necessary to hold public office under the State govU. S., i6o.
138 U. S., 496, 499.
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ernment. This right is exclusively in the State Legislature. To say that the interpretation of laws relating to the
qualifications of office-holders in the State can by any possibility involve the construction of a law of Congress, is
impossible. When the State Constitution says that one of
the qualifications for holding office in the State shall be
citizenship of the United States, it impliedly adopts the
naturalization laws of Congress as part of its laws relative
to those qualifications. The construction of the laws of
Congress by the State Courts in a case involving the right
of one to hold office in the State, is not nor cannot be
the construction of the laws of the United States, but of
the State. To put an illustration of this argument: A
State passes a law which requires the Governor of the State
to have the qualifications which are necessary for one to be
President of the United States. Would a decision by the
State Courts, that A. B., who had received the highest
number of votes, was thirty-four years old, and, therefore,
ineligible to hold the office of Governor, be reviewable in
the Supreme Court of the United States? Would not the
law requiring the Governor to be thirty-five years of age
be a law of the State, and its interpretation and application
the exclusive province of the State Judiciary?
The argument in favor of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court appears to us to be necessarily somewhat as
follows: The State, in requiring the same qualifications for
its office-holders as are required in order that one may become a citizen of the United States, places a qualification
for office which can only be determined by the Federal
Courts. Thus the question whether Boyd was entitled to
the Governorship of the State of Nebraska could only be
determined by first ascertaining the fact, to wit: Was he a
citizen of the United States? The Federal Courts alone are
competent for the final and authoritative ascertainment of
this fact. To leave its determination to a State tribunal
would be to deprive the citizens of the State and of the
United States of the equal protection of the laws, because
it would be to say that anyone whom the judges of the
State thought was not eligible for office, could not hold
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office. In other words, the State, by making as one of
their qualifications for holding office the fact that one has
complied with the laws of the United States, has necessarily surrendered to the Federal Courts the jurisdiction of
the question whether any individual has complied with
the law.
The importance and far-reaching consequences of the
decision cannot be overestimated. There is not a State in
Union which does not require .its office-holders to be citizens of the United States. The decision, therefore, brings
into the Supreme Court a great many political controversies concerning rights to a political office in a State. Concerning the soundness of the decision we do not venture an
opinion. But anything which adds to the possible number of the political controversies in the Supreme Court, and
especially State political controversies, is, from a practical
standpoint, to be sincerely r~gretted.
A NEw STATE TAX.--No sooner is one system of State
taxation on the subjects beyond its jurisdiction, or on interstate commerce, upset, then another scheme is concocted by
the members of the bar, or the committees of State legislatures. One of the most ingenious evei devised is embodied in the State tax law of North Carolina. The laws
of that State, which have been upheld as constitutional
both by the Federal Court for the Northern District of North
Carolina, and the Supreme Court of the State, tax all grocers, druggists, etc., on the gross purchases made by them
of certain articles, whether within or without the State.
The tax is called a License Tax for the permission to carry
on the drug or other business. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina upholds the tax on the ground that it is one
on the drug business which is carried on wholly within the
State. It may be objected, however, that the fact that a
business is carried on wholly within the State does not prevent it from being part of interstate or foreign commerce.
A shopkeeper must buy or make before he can sell. No
one would pretend that one can be taxed on all that he
makes outside the State, before he brings his products
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within the State. Can he be taxed on what he brings in
for the purpose of sale? Brown v. Maryland, and Low v.
Austin completely answer that question in the negative.
By what ingenuity of logic then can a State tax the value
of those things purchased for sale in the hands of him who
has purchased them, even before he has imported them?
It may be said that the tax is on the man, not on the goods.
But it may be asked, what better way to tax goods, than to
tax the owner, as in this case, according to the value of the
goods as gauged by the amount of money he paid for
them ?
THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE AND THE APPELLATE

CoURT.-In the case of the Grand Trunk Railway Co.

v. Ives ' the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice LAMAR,
has made a very careful review of the subject of the
negligence and contributory negligence. The law of negligence is, or ought to be, simple. There are two, and only
two, fundamental principles. First, that where there are
two persons, and one is acting with ordinary care, and. the
other is not, and as a result of such a lack of care he hurts
the former, he is responsible for the damage. Second, if
both were in fault, that is if neither observed ordinary
care, neither can recover 'from the other.' It is evident
that what is ordinary care varies with each' case. Ordinary
care in a child would not, though in exactly similar circumstances, be ordinary care for a man.' One set of facts
can never be a precedent for the determination of any other
set of facts. " Ordinary care" in any particular instance
is a fact, and not a law relating to those facts.'
If, therefore, there is one thing which one would imagine that under our system of jurisprudence would be a
fact for a jury, and not law for the court, it would be the
determination of whether there was "ordinary care"1 144 U. S., 408, decided April 4, 1892.
Butterfield v. Forrester, i i East., 6o.
3 Robinson v. Cone, 22 Vt., 213; Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol.
16, p.398 ; Title Negligence, 3.
4 What constitutes due care must depend upon the circumstances of
the case: CoLT, J., in Gaynor v. Old Colony R. R., ioo Mass., p. 214.
2
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under the peculiar circumstances of the case--exercised by
a defendant charged with negligence. Yet we constantly
hear that negligence is a mixed question of law and fact.
What is meant by this does not always seem to be clear in
the minds of those who employ the term.' The term itself
is misleading. It is employed in reference to negligence
in two ways. Stepping on a railroad track, not at a crossing, has been presumed to be contributory negligence by
the court.2 Just as in some States, not complying with
statutory regulations for the running of trains through the
city, is in law presumed to be negligence, -though as applied
to a particular road or a particular crossing, no one would
say that common prudence required one not to go on the
tracks after inspecting the road, or to mn at a slow rate of
speed. And yet if either of these facts appear in evidence
the case would have been takei from the jury by the court.
The court is not supposed to consider whether the action
of either party was her se neligence. The term "mixed
question," therefore, is very inapplicable. It is no more
"mixed" than any other application 6f law to facts. Again,
the second sense in which this term is used is where it is
intended to convey the idea that the court must first decide
whether there is sufficient evidence for the jury to say
whether there is negligence on the part of the plaintiff or
defendant, before allowing the jury to decide whether there
is negligence. As in the former case there is no question of fact, so in the latter case there is no question of
law. The court, in taking a case from the jury because
there is not evidence enough to warrant a jury in
finding negligence or ordinary care, simply decides a question of fact, acting as a thirteenth and supervising juror.
The use of the word "mixed" is, and always has been,
confusing, and it is not extraordinary that it does not appear
once in the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case we
1 See op. of CHRISTIANCY, Ch. J., in Lake Shore and Mich. R. R. Co.
v. Miller, 25 Mich., p. 299.
2 Mulhessin v. Delaware R. R. Co., 81 Pa. St, 366.
3
Schlereth v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 96 Mo., 5o ; Vi rginia Ry. Co. v.
White, 84 Va., 498.
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have referred to. On the other hand, Mr. Justice LAMAR
gives a very clear explanation of the principles which
should govern a court in deciding when to leave a question
of negligence to a jury. When a given statement is such
that reasonable men may fairly differ upon the question as
to whether there was negligence or not, the determination
of the matter is for the jury. It is only where the facts are
such that all reasonable men must draw the same conclusion from them, that the question of negligence is even considered to be one of law for the court.' It is necessary that
courts should exercise some control over the findings of a
jury. When the verdict is such that all men of common
sense would agree that the verdict is against the weight of
evidence, then it is the duty of the court to set that verdict
aside and grant a new trial. Surely, then, there is much to
be said in favor of the position taken by Mr. Justice FIELD,*
that where if the jury brought in any but one verdict, the
court would be obliged to set that verdict aside ; it is then a
matter for the court's discretion, whether they shall direct
a verdict for the defendant.'
The only difficulty-and it is a serious one-in allowing a judge to direct a jury on the evidence to bring a specific verdict, is the fact that the evidence is seldom plain and
undisputed. It maybe the province of the trial judge to act
as a thirteenth juror in drawing a conclusion of fact from the
facts in evidence, but there is no apparent necessity for his
acting in that capacity to assist the jury in determining
1 Op., p. 417.
2 op. in North Penn. R. R. v. Com. Bk., 223 U. S., p. 733.

Be says:

"It would be an idle proceeding to submit the evidence to the jury when
Citing Anderson County Commisthey could justly find only one way."
sioners v. Beal, 113 U. S., 227, 27r, Ch. J. CHRISTIANCY in Lake Shore &
Mich. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich., p. 292, puts the same thought in a
slightly different way when he says: "The laws of nature and of the
human mind, at least such of them as are obvious to the common comprehension of mankind, as well as the more obvious dictates of common
sense and principles of human action -which are assumed as truths in
any process of reasoningby the mass of sane minds-constitute part of •
the law of the land, and may, and must, he assumed by the court, without
being found by a jury; indeed, the finding of ajury which should clearly
disregard them, should itself be disregarded by the court."
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what facts are in evidence. Therefore, if binding instructions on questions of the proper conclusion of fact from the
facts in evidence are given by the judge, he should put the
case in a hypothetical manner: "That if the-jury believe,
etc.')
Negligence is a question of fact, but like all other
questions of that character, while properly a question for
the jury, they should not be allowed- to disregard reason
and common sense.
Admitting, therefore, the duty of the trial judge to refuse to receive a verdict against reason and common sense,
or even to direct the verdict of the jury where only one verdict can be given from the undisputed evidence, it does not
make the question of negligence any less a question of fact.
And if negligence or ordinary care is a pure question of fact
with absolutely no legal test of what is negligence or ordinary care in a particular case, why make the refusal of a
judge to grant a new trial, because the appellant thinks the
verdict was against the evidence, and that only one verdict
-the one in his favor-could have been rendered by reasonable men, the subject of a writ of error to a higher
court?
Such an appeal can, confessedly, solve no question of
law. The discussion, while burdening the reports, as the
innumerable accident cases do, can only reiterate the longsettled fundamental principles of the law of negligence, but
can never shed a ray of light on the decision of any other
case. The reason for this is evident. It is a question of
fact, not of law, which has been appealed. The Supreme
Court retry the case on the record, a task for which, having
failed to hear the evidence given, they are by no means as
well fitted as the trial judge.
The purpose of an appellate court is not to delay justice,
but to settle the law, and to see that inferior tribunals act
in accordance with the law. And yet where, perhaps, the
trial judge has made no error in law, the appellate tribunal
is asked to go over the evidence given in the case, because
the appellant's view of the evidence is not the same as the
See op. WgLsH, J., in Marietta Rd. Co. v. Pecksley, 24 0., 654.
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jury's. The result is that every accident case, which is not
compromised, isappealed in the hope that an appellate retrial
of the facts of the case will result in a reversal of the judgment. Thus a plaintiff is kept from the enjoyment of the
fruits of his verdict without any corresponding gain to the
community arising from the likelihood, of a more just result.
No matter how able the judge who tried the case, there is certain to be an appeal ; which the appellate court must take
time to listen to, because it demands a review of all the
evidence. This invariable delay for the purpose of delay
throws a contempt on the administration of justice.
But, to the legal mind, perhaps the most serious consequence of allowing appeals in questions of fact, is the
tendency observable in all the courts, except such carefully
selected tribunals as the Supreme Court of the United
States, and some of our State Supreme Courts, to regard
questions of negligence in particular cases as questions
consisting mainly of legal presumptions. In every appeal
the briefs of counsel are burdened with cases whose facts
are, or are claimed to be, somewhat similar to the facts of
the case argued and in which certain decisions were made.
The courts in their turn-the habit of looking to precedents
being strong-in their opinions cite their prior opinions
in cases with approval, or distinguish their former opinions
from the one before them; so that what was at one time a
mere opinion as to the proof in a particular case, tends to
become a settled legal presumption and part of a so-called
law of negligence. It may be affirmed with confidence
that nothing so surely tends to defeat justice as to clog the
determination of the question of whether A. B. or C. in
peculiar. circumstances used ordinary care or reasonable
care, as i text-book full of arbitrary legal presumptions of

what is ordinary and what is reasonable care. It is only
the obsolete system of the schoolman of the middle ages
reinstated.

